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We present, for the ﬁrst time, a model of recent institutional de-
velopments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions.
Recognizing the ﬁnancing constraints that British cost rules may im-
pose on litigants, these new contractual arrangements combine con-
tingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the
case: we call these “Third Party Contingency” (TPC) contracts. Sign-
ing a TPC contract can make ﬁling a suit credible and may increase
settlement amounts. This does not, however, increase the likelihood
of going to trial, since TPC contracts are only of mutual beneﬁt to the
plaintiﬀ and the third party when the case settles out of court. We
also ﬁnd that the mere availability of TPCs may generate the above
strategic eﬀect.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes a new contractual arrangement that has arisen in Europe
recently and which is mirrored by developments in other European jurisdic-
tions. A party that is not involved in the legal dispute, like an insurance
ﬁrm, proposes to cover a (prospective) plaintiﬀ’s litigation costs if the case
reaches trial in return for a share of the settlement or trial proceeds. We call
this a “Third Party Contingency” (or TPC) contract to distinguish it from
contingent fee arrangements between a plaintiﬀ and his lawyer.
Legal cost and its funding can play a pivotal role in assuring access to justice
and eﬃciency of the civil legal system.1 The principal issues at stake are the
magnitude and unpredictability of the cost of running a legal case and the
timing of this expenditure. Thus, ﬁghting a case can be expensive, and much
of the expenditure may occur before an award of damages that can be used to
fund it. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions the rules of civil procedure require
the loser (whose identity cannot be known in advance) to pay the winner’s
cost - the so-called “British” cost rule. Even under this cost-shifting rule
individuals who are risk averse or liquidity constrained may be prevented
from bringing a case, thus preventing the legal system from achieving its
twin goals of compensation and eﬃcient deterrence.
In such circumstances, it is unsurprising - and desirable - that institutional
mechanisms develop to provide liquidity and insurance to prospective liti-
gants. Broadly, several sources of such funds can be distinguished. In the
US, lawyers typically bear a measure of risk and front-loading of cost by
taking cases on a contingency fee basis and meeting upfront disbursements.
In some European jurisdictions, insurance companies perform similar func-
tions by oﬀering before-the-event Legal Cost Insurance policies that have to
be purchased before any actionable event. Elsewhere in Europe (e.g. the
UK and Holland) state-sponsored legal aid has, until recently, provided tax-
ﬁnanced assistance to litigants whose ﬁnancial status satisﬁed a means test
1Bebchuk (1998) correctly points out that even a legitimate claim can face a cost
barrier that is too high. Thus, cases of negative expected value (the expected litigation
cost exceeds the expected returns from the judgement) are not necessarily nuisance suits.
2and whose cases were judged to be of suﬃcient merit.
Importantly, recent experience suggests that the menu of funding arrange-
ments can be extremely dynamic in response to changing circumstances with
third parties being involved in many of these developments. In England and
Wales, for example, the growing cost of legal aid in the 1980s and early 1990s
led the government to withdraw it (in 1999) from many types of case and
to promote other (private) means of funding. In particular, conditional fee
agreements (where the lawyer waives his hourly fee in the event of loss, in
return for a predetermined percentage uplift in the event of success) have
moved to the fore along with after-the-event insurance policies, purchased
after an actionable event from legal cost insurers. The combined eﬀect of
these arrangements is to insulate the litigant from own and opposing legal
fees in the event of a loss. More broadly, in a market where before-the-event
Legal Cost Insurance has traditionally been stiﬂed by the existence of legal
aid, a variety of new insurance products are appearing.2
Other jurisdictions are seeing similar interesting, and economically impor-
tant, developments. An increasing number of German ﬁrms have begun to
oﬀer “Third Party Contingency” contract, thereby introducing US-style con-
tingency arrangements under the British cost allocation rule.3 In line with
new UK developments, a TPC contract can be agreed after-the-event. The
third party agrees to cover the potential plaintiﬀ’s cost in the event of a loss
(under the British rule, this will include the opponent’s cost). In turn, the
third party does not receive an up-front payment (as in the case of Legal
Cost Insurance),4 but demands a pre-speciﬁed fraction of any damages if the
case is successful.
By helping to diversify the risks of paying all cost in the event of loss, insurers
help meet a traditional objection to the use of contingency payment under a
British cost rule: contingency fees do not - in principle - protect the plaintiﬀ
against own disbursements or the opponent’s in the event of a loss.5 Legal
Cost Insurance, on the other hand, would cover both sides’ attorney cost
2See Rickman/Gray (1995); Fenn/Gray/Rickman/Carrier (2002).
3FORIS AG (see www.foris-ag.de) was the ﬁrst to introduce such arrange-
ments. Within the last few years, numerous competitors in Germany, Switzerland,
and Austria have emerged, among which are www.juragent-derprozessﬁnanzierer.de,
www.prozessﬁnanzierung.at, www.das-proﬁ.de, www.gloria-prozessﬁnanzierung.de and
www.exactor.de.
4See Bebchuk (1996) for a general discussion of the strategic eﬀect of up-front pay-
ments that decrease the remaining trial cost and thereby make the threat to sue credible;
see Kirstein (2000) for an application to the case of Legal Cost Insurance.
5Lord Chancellor’s Department (1989).
3as well as the court fees. Only larger legal ﬁrms would be able to oﬀer
contingent fee contracts containing such protection. If smaller law ﬁrms could
not provide such extensive cover, then their clients were burdened with it and
the objectives of the contingency funding would be blunted. Bearing this in
mind, it is important to consider how these new institutional developments
may inﬂuence the performance of the legal system.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the particular class of such new
arrangements, exempliﬁed by the TPC contracts described above. We pay
particular attention to the incentives they create for bringing cases and for
settling or trying them. We focus on these because some of the other de-
velopments mentioned above have received treatment elsewhere.6 Our work
builds on the existing literature on the economics of litigation, cost rules and
fee arrangements that has, following Posner (1973) and Shavell (1982),
analyzed the economic inﬂuences of procedural arrangements (such as cost
rules) on legal cases. Similarly, a variety of authors have analyzed the eﬀects
of fee arrangements in this area.7 Most recently, models have started to look
at the role played by Legal Cost Insurance.8
In a paper related to ours, Smith (1992) considers the combination of British
cost rules with US-style contingency fees. However, his paper bears in-
complete resemblance to the institutional characteristics of mechanisms now
emerging to make this link (such as the role of third parties) and his frame-
work ignores many strategic issues. By providing a treatment of the institu-
tional details and some of the strategic issues, our paper is therefore the ﬁrst
game-theoretic model of the latest class of funding arrangements, the TPC
contracts.
Cooter/Porat (2002) and Polinsky/Rubinfeld (2001) also analyze
third party arrangements in connection with contingent fees. However, these
arrangements are amendments to contingent fee contracts between plaintiﬀs
and their attorneys in order to solve double-sided moral-hazard problems
that typically arise if the contingent fee is agreed between plaintiﬀ and attor-
ney directly. The TPC contract we analyze here introduces a contingent fee
arrangement between a third party and the plaintiﬀ, thus without altering
the way his attorney is paid. Since we focus on the contract between the
third party and the plaintiﬀ that does not aﬀect the (potential) principal-
agent problems addressed by these papers, the latter is left out of focus in
6E.g., Emons (2000) on contingent fees, or Gravelle/Waterson (1993).
7See Rickman (1994) for a survey.
8See Kirstein (2000), van Velthoeven/van Wijck (2001) and
Heyes/Rickman/Tzavara (2001).
4our analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present a model of
the decision to settle/drop or try a legal case. The model is based on the “di-
vergent expectations” hypothesis.9 It examines the conditions under which a
bargaining range exists within which the litigants can negotiate a settlement
of the case (given their expectations about what will happen if negotations
fail. Although the reason for the divergent expectations hypothesis is not
endogenously derived in such models, they provide a helpful tool for focusing
the analysis on the new funding mechanism in question.
An alternative approach models the settlement process as the outcome of a
bargaining game with asymmetric information (e.g. Bebchuk, 1984; Rein-
ganum/Wilde, 1986). Such a bargaining game may take place over time,
e.g., Spier, (1992). Here, divergence of expectations is endogenous to the
information structure. An ongoing empirical debate surrounds which of these
approaches is generally most appropriate; Waldfogel (1998) presents em-
prical evidence supporting Posner-type models such as ours.
We then compute and compare the subgame perfect equilibria for three ver-
sions of the settlement game: a benchmark case without TPCs; a case where
such arrangements are in place at the start of settlement negotiations; and
a case where they can be entered into even after the settlement negotiations
have already started. The fourth section contains a discussion of possible
modiﬁcations of the model, and the ﬁnal section oﬀers our conclusions.
2 “Third Party Contingency” contracts
2.1 The basic model
Suppose, following an accident, that a plaintiﬀ (P) has a claim against a
defendant (D). In order to fund his claim, P may either retain a lawyer on
a standard (hourly) contract or enter into a TPC contract with an insurer
(denoted F).10 Our objective is to analyze the circumstances in which such
a contract will be oﬀered and purchased, and its eﬀects on the ensuing liti-
9See Posner (1973), Shavell (1982) and more recently Eisenberg/Farber (2003,
100 f.). Miceli (1998, 473) speaks of “diﬀering perceptions” models. The paper
by Priest/Klein (1984) started an ongoing debate concerning the “trial-selection-
hypothesis”.
10In principle, D may also enter into a contingency-style contract to fund the defense:
see Painter (1995) for a discussion of this possibility.
5gation.
The value of P’s claim is Y > 0 and aggregate litigation cost (of P and D)
are G > 0 if a trial occurs, whereas settlement costs are zero for simplicity.
We assume the British cost allocation rule: the loser has to pay both parties’
cost. Both P and D have subjective beliefs that P will win at trial.
We assume F and P to have identical beliefs as to the plaintiﬀ’s chances of
prevailing in court.11 We denote the subjective probability beliefs of litigant
i ∈ {P;D} as qi, with 0 < qi < 1. Finally, P, D and F are all assumed to be
risk neutral.
Our basic model consists of three stages:
1. P and F may bargain over a TPC contract. If they make a contract
then F commits to covering the litigation cost if P loses at trial.12 In
turn, F receives a share µ ∈]0,1[ of all returns P acquires. Without a
contract, F receives nothing and P has to bear the full litigation cost
if he loses in court.
2. In both cases, with and without a TPC contract, the parties, P and
D, negotiate over a settlement. If they come to an agreement then
the payoﬀs of P, D, and F are [S,−S,0] without a TPC contract, and
[(1 − µ)ST,−ST,µST] if a TPC contract has been made.13 To keep
the analysis simple, we assume the symmetric Nash bargaining solu-
tion (with equal bargaining power) when solving for the settlement
amount.14
3. If no settlement has occurred, P decides whether to proceed to trial or
11This assumption does not reﬂect the expertise F may have in evaluating a case, though
it is possible that P’s attorney may have provided similar advice. It is a simpliﬁcation that
helps to keep the ﬁnal step of the analysis tractable, and will be relaxed in the discussion.
However, it is clearly this expertise that distinguishes ﬁrms like FORIS from other credit
sources, like banks.
12As we have mentioned in the introduction, this assumption distinguishes the present
contracts from the way that contingency fees have traditionally been envisaged in the
context of British cost rules. We note that a veto clause can sometimes relax F’s exposure
to cost, but incorporating this would be beyond the scope of the current paper.
13The index T indicates the existence of a TPC contract.
14Our results would also hold for an asymmetric bargaining situation, as long as the
bargaining power is not entirely in the plaintiﬀ’s hands. In that case his position can-
not be improved anymore by a strategic move. The Nash bargaining solution can be
shown to approximate a number of well-known strategic bargaining extensive forms,
so its use does not preclude some examples of non-cooperative behaviour: see Bin-
more/Rubinstein/Wolinsky (1986).
6not. Without a TPC contract, the expected payoﬀs are [qPY − (1 −
qP)G,−qD(Y + G),0]. If, on the other hand, a TPC contract exists,
the expected payoﬀs are [(1−µ)qPY,−qD(Y +G),µqPY −(1−qP)G].
The basic model rests on the assumption that no settlement negotiations
between P and D take place before F and P have bargained about a TPC
contract. In the following sections, we analyze the subgame perfect equilibria
of this litigation game. Section 2.2 presents an analysis of the subgame in
which no TPC contract has been agreed (this subgame is called “Game 1”
and would be equivalent to a situation where TPC contracts are not available
at all). In section 2.3, we complete the analysis of the basic model (which we
call “Game 2”): ﬁrst, we derive the subgame results when a TPC contract
has been signed; then we compare these results with those of Game 1.
In a modiﬁcation of the basic model, we allow for settlement negotiations
between P and D to take place before F and P have talked about a contract.
This is called “Game 3” and will be analyzed in section 3.1. The modiﬁcation
demonstrates the strategic impact of the availability of TPC contracts, even
if they are not used in equilibrium .
2.2 Subgame without TPC contract: Game 1
Figure 1 shows the sequence of events in Game 1, the situation without a
TPC contract.15 Here, P and D bargain over the case without P having any
recourse to F. The ﬁrst event is the settlement bargaining between P and D,
represented by the rectangle in Figure 1 that is labeled with (P, D). If the
parties come to an agreement, the payoﬀs of P, D and F16 are [S,−S,0]. The
other payoﬀs can easily be derived, using the trial technology: if P proceeds
to trial, he expects to prevail with probability qP, which would yield Y . He
expects to lose with probability (1−qP), having to bear litigation cost G. D
expects to lose with probability qD; in this case he has to pay Y + G, and
zero otherwise. If P does not proceed to court, all players get zero payoﬀ.
We start the derivation of subgame perfect equilibria with the analysis of
the trial stage. If settlement has failed, P will only proceed to trial if the
15The analysis of Game 1 does not provide new insights, since the results in this sec-
tion are long established in the Law and Economics literature since Landes (1971); see
Shavell (1982). We review these well known results to introduce our notation, and use
them as a benchmark for our own results in the subsequent sections.
16Even though Game 1 is played by the litigants P and D only, the payoﬀ vector also
contains an entry for F, since Game 1 can also be seen as a subgame of Game 2 below in
which F plays an active role.
























[qPY − (1 − qP)G,−qD(Y + G),0]
[S,−S,0]
case has positive expected value (PEV), i.e. if qPY − (1 − qP)G > 0. This





If, on the one hand, condition (1) is fulﬁlled, then the parties will meet
in court if no settlement occurs. In this case, D faces an expected loss of
−qD(Y +G) if he fails to settle. A settlement payment S is hence acceptable
for him if it is smaller than the absolute expected loss at trial, or if S <
qD(Y +G). P’s expected payoﬀ from trial is qPY −(1−qP)G. Thus, P accepts
a settlement that exceeds this expected payment, i.e., if S > qPY −(1−qP)G.
Therefore, the bargaining range in a PEV case without TPC contract is
]qPY − (1 − qP)G,qD(Y + G)[ (2)
If this bargaining range is empty, the parties do not come to an agreement,
and P proceeds to court. The condition for this outcome is qPY −(1−qP)G >
qD(Y + G) or, equivalently,




If, however, qPY −(1−qP)G < qD(Y +G) holds, then the bargaining range is
non-empty and the parties agree upon a settlement. Applying the symmetric
Nash bargaining solution, the predicted bargaining result is ˆ S = 0.5[qPY −
(1 − qP)G] + 0.5qD(Y + G) or, equivalently,
ˆ S = 0.5[(qp + qD)(Y + G) − G] (4)
8If, on the other hand, condition (1) is violated, or qPY < (1−qP)G, then the
case has negative expected value (NEV).17 If no settlement occurs, then P
will not proceed to court, and both parties’ payoﬀs are zero. Thus, in a NEV
case the bargaining range is ]0,0[ which is an empty set. In this situation,
P’s threat to sue is not credible.
The above analysis demonstrates that, for each possible parameter constel-
lation, Game 1 has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Three outcomes
are possible depending on the parameters Y,G,qP and qD. This leads to our
ﬁrst result.
Proposition 1: In the subgame without TPC contract (Game
1), given Y,G,qP and qD,
• P refuses to settle and proceeds to court if, and only if,
qP > qD + G/(Y + G),
• P and D agree upon a settlement out of court for ˆ S if, and
only if, G/(Y + G) < qP < qD + G/(Y + G),
• drops the case if, and only if, G/(Y + G) > qP
Figure 2 presents the three possible outcomes of Game 1, depending on the
parameters qD and qP. The diagonal line represents condition (3) while
the horizontal line represents condition (1). In the upper left triangle, the
subgame perfect equilibrium path is (no settlement, trial).
In the lower rectangle, the case has NEV and the equilibrium path is (no
settlement, no trial). In the upper right area, the parties come to a settlement
payment ˆ S in equilibrium. Thus, Result 1 tells us that the case is more likely
to be brought the more optimistic P is (relative to D) about his chances at
trial (qP), or if the value of the claim (Y ) is high in relation to litigation cost
(G).
2.3 TPC contracts before settlement negotiation:
Game 2
Having examined the subgame without a TPC contract, we now consider
the prospect of P purchasing a TPC contract from F. The TPC contract
bargaining between F and P is assumed to happen before any settlement
17For simplicity, we ignore ties (such as qPY − (1 − qP)G = 0).




















negotiations take place. Our analysis assumes that the details of the contract
are publicized to D, though not to the judge should trial ensue.18
2.3.1 The subgame with TPC contracts
Game 2 consists of a contract stage where F and P negotiate over a TPC
contract. The contract stage is followed by two subgames: one in which no
contract has been made (this is Game 1 we have just analyzed), the other one
with a TPC contract. Figure 3 shows this sequence of events. The contract
stage is represented by the rectangle labeled (F, P). Following the signing of
a contract, settlement negotiations start (represented by the rectangle that
is labeled as (P, D)). If P and D come to an settlement, then payment is now
denoted as ST and the payoﬀs of P, D and F are [(1 − µ)ST,−ST,µST].
The other consequence of a TPC contract is a modiﬁcation of the payoﬀs if
settlement fails and P decides whether to proceed to trial or not: on the one
18Diﬀerent jurisdictions deal with this matter in diﬀerent ways. For example, FORIS
AG (see note 2), as well as its competitors, prohibit the publication of this information by
a contract clause, while procedural rules in the UK require that some attention is drawn
to the existence - at least - of conditional fee arrangements, see (Stanbury (2001)).
10hand, he no longer worries about the litigation cost, on the other he has to
share his returns with F. F’s share is denoted by µ; thus, P receives a share
of (1−µ). Hence, the (expected) payoﬀs to P, D, and F in case of a trial are
[(1 − µ)qPY,−qD(Y + G),µqPY − (1 − qP)G].






































As long as µ < 1, a TPC contract obviously turns each case into a credible
threat, so P will always sue if the parties fail to settle. D faces the expected
loss −qD(Y + G). P expects a gain (1 − µ)qPY at trial. If the parties agree
upon a settlement payment ST, then P collects his share (1 − µ)ST. The
comparison of the trial and the settlement outcome allows us to derive the
threshold above which a settlement is acceptable for P. He favors a settlement
to a trial if (1 − µ)ST > (1 − µ)qPY . This is equivalent to ST > qPY . Note
that this threshold value is greater than in Game 1.
For D, the existence of a TPC contract has no impact on his threshold for
which a settlement is agreeable. Therefore, the bargaining range in the pres-
ence of a TPC contract is
]qPY,qD(Y + G)[ (5)
Because (1 − qP)G > 0, this interval is a subset of the bargaining range
without the funding contract, see (2). In particular, the contract results in an
11upward shift of the lower boundary of the bargaining range corresponding to
P’s protection against cost. The parties will proceed to court if the bargaining





If this “trial condition” holds, then the parties meet in court and the expected
payoﬀs of P, D, and F are [(1 − µ)qPY,−qD(Y + G),µqPY − (1 − qP)G]. If
condition (6) is not fulﬁlled, the parties come to a settlement agreement
ˆ ST = 0.5[(qP + qD)Y + qDG] (7)
We thereby have derived our second result:
Proposition 2: In the subgame of Game 2 where a TPC contract
between F and P has been made,
• P proceeds to trial if, and only if, qP > qD(Y + G)/Y ;
• P and D settle out of court for ˆ ST if, and only if, qP <
qD(Y + G)/Y .
• If a settlement occurs, then the agreed upon settlement pay-
ment is higher than in the subgame without a TPC contract,
i.e., ˆ ST > ˆ S.19
Note that ˆ ST is strictly greater than ˆ S, the settlement result without a TPC
contract. We denote the diﬀerence as ∆ˆ S = ˆ ST − ˆ S > 0.
Figure 4 demonstrates the two possible outcomes of this subgame of Game 2.
The area above the diagonal line represents condition (6). If the values of qP
and qD are situated in this area, then the parties are predicted to proceed to
trial, whereas litigants with parameter values below this line are motivated
settle their case.
Comparing Figure 4 with our benchmark case in Figure 2 we see that there
is no longer a lower rectangle where trial is a non-credible threat. Thus,
the insurance function of the TPC contract ensures that P will always be
willing to go to court, which is a necessary condition to motivate D to accept
positive settlement payments. We also know that, when both games lead to
settlement, the presence of a contract generates a higher gross settlement for
P.
19This relation also holds for any other distribution of the settlement rent between P
and D, due to an asymmetric bargaining solution, as long as P’s share is positive.



























2.3.2 Incentives to make a TPC contract
Under what circumstances will P and F ﬁnd it mutually beneﬁcial to enter
into a TPC contract? To examine this question we compare the outcomes of
the two possible subgames of Game 2, the one with a TPC contract and the
one without. Figure 5 brings together Figure 2 and Figure 4. According to
Figure 5, we have to distinguish ﬁve cases when comparing the two subgames
that start right after the contract stage in Game 2.
Case a) In the upper left triangle of Figure 5, labeled a), both litigants are
overly optimistic. Therefore, they would meet in court regardless of whether
a TPC contract has been made. However, the contract increases P’s expected
payoﬀ by ∆ˆ S. Thus, it would beneﬁt P if (1 − µ)qPY > qPY − (1 − qP)G
or, equivalently, µqPY < (1 − qP)G: the agreed share for F must not be
“too large”. F, in turn, will ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to oﬀer a TPC contract if
µqPY − (1 − qP)G > 0. Clearly, this contradicts the condition for P. Thus,
in the subgame perfect equilibrium, P takes the case to trial unaided. The
equilibrium path under the parameters deﬁning a) is:
(no contract, no settlement, trial).







































Case b) Under the parameter combinations in the triangle labeled b), the
parties would settle in the absence of a TPC contract. Then, P’s payoﬀ
would be ˆ S. However, under the contract P proceeds to court, which leads
to an expected payoﬀ of (1−µ)qPY . P ﬁnds a TPC contract beneﬁcial if this
exceeds the settlement payoﬀ ˆ S he receives in the absence of such a contract.
The condition for F to ﬁnd a contract beneﬁcial is µqPY > (1 − qP)G. It
is easy to show that these two conditions, if they are simultaneously true,
would imply qP > G/(Y + G) + qD, which is the condition for case a) and
thus contradicts the conditions for case b).20 Hence, under the parameter
constellations that characterize case b), a TPC contract cannot be mutually
beneﬁcial for F and P. Thus, no contract will be made, and the analysis of
Game 1 shows that the case will be settled out of court. The subgame perfect
equilibrium path is:
(no contract, settlement with ˆ S).
20(1 − µ)qPY > ˆ S is equivalent to µqPY < 0.5[qP(Y − G) − qDY + (1 − qP)G]. With
µqPY > (1 − qP)G, this implies 0.5[qP(Y − G) − qDY + (1 − qP)G] > (1 − qP)G, which
is equivalent to qP(Y − G) − qDY + (1 − qD)G > 2(1 − qP)G. Rearrangement leads to
qP(Y + G) > G + qD(Y + G), implying case a), which excludes case b).
14Case c) In the upper right area of Figure 5, denoted as c), the parties settle
regardless of the presence of a TPC contract; the contract simply increases
the settlement result to ˆ ST from ˆ S. P receives (1−µ)ˆ ST, which is beneﬁcial
if (1−µ)ˆ ST > ˆ S or, equivalently, µ < ∆ˆ S/ˆ ST. This is P’s threat point in the
contract negotiations with F. Note that this threat point is strictly positive,
since ∆ˆ S > 0. The bargaining range between F and P thus is [0,∆ˆ S/ˆ ST]. For
F, any positive share µ > 0 would be beneﬁcial. Thus, a non-empty range of
values for µ exists that makes the TPC contract beneﬁcial for both F and P.
Applying the symmetric Nash bargaining solution leads to an agreed share,





Note that ∆ˆ S/2ˆ ST ∈]0,1[. The subgame perfect equilibrium path of Game
2 then is:
(contract with ˆ µ, settlement with ˆ ST).
Case d) In the lower right area labeled d), the parties would settle if a
TPC contract has been signed. Without it, the case has NEV and therefore
P’s payoﬀ is zero. Thus, any µ ∈ [0,1] is agreeable to P and F. The symmetric
Nash bargaining solution predicts µ = 0.5 as the agreement between P and
F. Thus, the subgame perfect equilibrium path is:
(contract with µ = 0.5, settlement with ˆ ST).
Case e) In the ﬁnal triangle labeled e), the parties do not settle in either
Game 1 or Game 2, but for diﬀerent reasons. In Game 1, the parties do not
settle since the trial has NEV. In Game 2, P would proceed to trial anyway
(because the contract protects him from any trial cost). We have already
demonstrated under case b) that, if the plaintiﬀ proceeds to court in case a
TPC contract is made, then there is no bilateral gain for F and P. Thus, the
subgame perfect equilibrium path is:
(no contract, no settlement, no trial).
The above insights allow for the following conclusion:
Proposition 3: In Game 2, a TPC contract will be agreed if,
and only if, P and D come to a post-contract settlement in the
subsequent game, i.e. in the areas c) and d) of Figure 5.
15Thus, a TPC contract is part of the equilibrium if, and only if, the condition
qP < qD(Y +G)/Y holds. In this case, D and P come to a settlement result
ˆ ST which exceeds the settlement result without a contract: ˆ S in case c) and
zero in case d). F and P may distribute this mutual gain by the agreed share
for F, namely ˆ µ.
In area d), any share µ ∈]0,1[ is bilaterally beneﬁcial. Thus, the predicted
share for F is 0.5 and therefore independent of the parameters qP,qD,G and
Y . In area c) however, the predicted share ˆ µ depends on these parameters.
A comparative static analysis of ˆ µ demonstrates that it is decreasing in the
plaintiﬀ’s subjective probability of prevailing, qP, whereas it is increasing in
qD and G. Note that even a completely optimistic plaintiﬀ (with qP = 1)
can beneﬁt from making a TPC contract in order to increase his settlement
result. Of course, this requires a suﬃciently pessimistic defendant, i.e., qD >
Y/(Y +G), since the parties would otherwise proceed to court. In a contract
with a very optimistic plaintiﬀ, the predicted share for F will be rather small.
Furthermore, note that whenever it is mutually beneﬁcial for F and P to
make a TPC contract, a settlement is triggered and F does not actually
have to bear the risk of having to pay litigation cost. Thus, the actual risk
that F has to cover is zero, and any positive value of µ agreed between F
and P would constitute “unfair insurance”. However, in the current model,
the TPC contract is not made to cover risks but to induce (or increase) a
settlement.21 This is the reason why the TPC contract is beneﬁcial even for
risk-neutral customers.
3 Discussion
3.1 Settlement before TPC contract: Game 3
In this section, we consider the possibility of entering a TPC contract after
the pre-trial settlement negotiations have already begun. This is an option
under many of the newly emerging after-the-event insurance arrangements.
As we shall see for the class of arrangements under study, the outcome for
F changes if potential customers are allowed to start settlement negotiations
before agreeing a TPC contract.
21Note that this analysis is based on the assumption that the amount at stake, Y , is
exogenously given and constant. A higher amount at stake c.p. increases the number of
combinations of qP and qD that lead to trial, whereas the settlement area shrinks.
16Figure 6 shows the event tree of this new Game 3. First, the parties P and
D bargain over a settlement. If they agree upon a payment, now denoted
as ˜ S, then the payoﬀs for P, D, and F are [˜ S,−˜ S,0]. If the parties fail
to settle immediately, then they enter Game 2 as described in the previous
section. Thus, Game 2 is now a subgame of Game 3, and was already shown
to have ﬁve possible outcomes, represented by parameter combinations a) to
e) above. In these cases, the parties would expect no TPC contract to be
signed during the subsequent game if they fail to settle in the ﬁrst place.
Only c) and d) make a TPC contract feasible if the ﬁrst-round settlement
is not agreed upon. Therefore, only these parameter combinations require
further analysis now.
These two sets of parameters are characterized by the condition qP < qD(Y +
G)/Y . The equilibrium path in Game 2 includes a TPC contract and a
settlement ˆ ST (see Proposition 2). Given this subgame result, in Game 3 a
settlement result during stage 1 is acceptable for D if ˜ S < ˆ ST, and for P if
˜ S > (1 − µ)ˆ ST.
Hence, the bargaining range in this ﬁrst stage of Game 3 is ](1 − µ)ˆ ST, ˆ ST[.
This range is non-empty for any value of µ > 0. Thus, the parties have
an incentive to settle in the ﬁrst place, without actually proceeding to the
contract stage. It is, therefore, the mere opportunity to conclude a TPC
contract in the subsequent game which develops an impact on the parties’
behavior.
Recall that without TPC contracts being available, the parties were conﬁned
to Game 1. In the parameter set d), the case would be dropped. In Game 3,
the parties are motivated to settle the case. In case c), the parties would settle
both in Game 3 and in Game 1. However, the gross settlement is increased.
Again, the threat of a contract is suﬃcient to inﬂuence the behavior of the
disputing parties. Without actually signing a TPC contract, its availability
increases the settlement. However, F, whose existence plays an important
role in Game 3, actually receives no business.22
3.2 Existence of a TPC contract as a signal
An interesting implication of our analysis involves the extent to which the
existence of a contract should be revealed to an opposing litigant. We have
22Future work might usefully examine whether TPC contracts contain clauses restricting
the amount or type of pre-contract negotiations that can have taken place prior to signing
a contract.













noted that practice may diﬀer across jurisdictions in this regard. However,
in our model, the strategic eﬀects we have derived are due to the defendant’s
awareness of the TPC agreement. This raises the interesting question of why
suppliers of TPC contracts in Germany typically prevent this information
from being divulged.
It is possible that an asymmetric information model of litigation would help
illuminate this issue: the insurer may be happy to signal “good news” (case
strength) but not “bad news” (if it has taken on a relatively weak case). A
signaling model like Reinganum/Wilde (1986) would be a possible route
for further research here.
We might furthermore ask whether a judge, modeled as a rational player,
would be able to infer anything about the subjective beliefs of P (on the
strength of his case) if he could observe a TPC contract. Bayesian updating
would require the judge not to know the actual values of qP and qD, but to
assume a prior distribution. If the judge could make such an inference, then
a clause protecting the presence of a TPC contract might make sense insofar
as it protects the plaintiﬀ from lowering his odds in court.
In the context of our model, the only cases that come before the judge at
trial are those in which no TPC contract has been made. Thus, even if
the existence of a TPC contract is revealed to the other side, this does not
necessarily imply that the judge can see this particular information. This
could be diﬀerent if the judge adopted a more “pro-active” attitude to case
18management by even observing pre-trial settlement negotiations. If he were
be able to observe the existence of a TPC contract, he may update his beliefs
using Bayes’ rule. However, even in this case the judge can not infer the
plaintiﬀ’s subjective probability of prevailing, qP, with certainty because the
presence of a TPC contract is consistent with all values of qP between 0 and
1 (see ﬁgure 5).
3.3 The impact of predetermined shares
So far, our analysis has sought situations in which F and P can agree a mu-
tually beneﬁcial contract (i.e. µ). We therefore have assumed that a suitable
µ will be agreed endogenously. In fact, the standard contract issued by the
originator of TPC arrangements (FORIS AG) ﬁxes F’s share in advance of
such negotiations and, eﬀectively, makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” contract oﬀer
of µ = 0.3. How does this aﬀect our analysis?
In the context of our model, this take-it or leave-it oﬀer to potential clients
imposes an additional constraint on the mutual gains from contracting. We
have seen that cases c) and d) in Figure 5 are those where a TPC contract
would be agreed and we can limit our analysis now to the former (recall that
case d) would arise for any value of µ).
Case c) is characterized by the conditions qP < qD(Y + G)/Y and qP >
G/(Y + G). Recall that a TPC contract is bilaterally beneﬁcial for F and P
if the agreed share, µ, fulﬁlls two conditions simultaneously: the contract is
beneﬁcial for F if µ > 0, and it is beneﬁcial for P if µ < ∆ˆ S/ˆ ST.
Thus, a contract with an exogenously ﬁxed share is always agreeable for F.
P, however, will only agree to such a contract if the ﬁxed share also holds












In Figure 7, this condition is represented by the area below the uppermost
diagonal line starting at qP = G/(0.3Y +G). If this line intercepts the upper
boundary of the square at a value of qD which is smaller than Y/(Y +G),i.e.,
19in area a), then the extra constraint is non-binding - it does not aﬀect area
c). This happens when 2G > 3Y , i.e. when the litigation costs are so large
relative to potential winnings that F and P would be unable to agree a TPC
contract anyway.23
The relevant cases are those with a smaller G, relative to Y , when the slope
of the line is smaller. If 2G < 3Y , this line divides area c) into two parts.
Now, for parameter combinations in c) above the new line, a TPC contract
with a ﬁxed share of µ = 0.3 is not beneﬁcial for P, since condition (9) is
violated. On the line and below, within area c), a TPC contract with a ﬁxed
share µ = 0.3 would be beneﬁcial for P, i.e., condition (9) holds.








































23The line then crosses the upper border in area a), to left of area c) if, for qP = 1, the





The right hand side of this equation is smaller than Y/(Y + G) if 0.6Y 2 < 0.4GY or,
equivalently, 2G > 3Y . Note that Figure 7 also assumes that 6Y < 7G, so the line crosses
the upper border to left of qD = 1. With 6Y > 7G, the line would be ﬂatter and would
cross the right border of Figure 7.
203.4 If F is more optimistic than P
In the previous analysis, we have assumed P and F to have identical beliefs
as to P’s trial chances. In formal terms, this assumption means qF = qP
where qF denotes F’s subjective probability that P prevails in court. The
results derived for cases a) to e) require this assumption. This is particularly
important in cases a) and e), where no TPC contract is signed when qF = qP.
To see how things can change when we relax this assumption, suppose
qF > qP. Now, a non-empty set of TPC contracts may exist even if
the case proceeds to trial. This can easily be shown for case a). In
this case, concluding a TPC contract is beneﬁcial for P if, and only if,





Note that, for any µ < 1, the right hand side of this condition is greater than
G/(Y + G), one of the conditions that constitute case a). For F, a contract




Thus, in case a) it is possible that a contract is bilaterally beneﬁcial. This is
demonstrated in ﬁgure 8. This ﬁgure shows the parameter constellations for
case a) as a triangle in the upper left corner. We have added a horizontal line
that represents qP = G/(µY + G). If qF is above this line, and qP is below
this line within the case a) triangle, then a TPC contract is beneﬁcial for
both F and P. The contract rent will be distributed according to the agreed
upon value of µ.
Note that this result is only valid for the case when all players are highly
optimistic, and F is even more optimistic than P. Since it is P who turns to F
and presents the relevant facts, the idea that F’s subjective belief diﬀers from
P’s requires some justiﬁcation. F may come to such a result if its evaluation
of the case is based on superior diagnostic skill, or if P withholds relevant
facts. Since this evaluation process is not taken into account in our model,
the careful analysis of divergent expectations between F and P goes beyond
the scope of this article.




















There are a number of other ways in which the model we have presented
can be extended. To begin with, a class of economic models of pre-trial bar-
gaining have, since Bebchuk (1984), assumed the presence of asymmetric
information between the parties. This typically prevents cases from necessar-
ily settling when gains from trade are present. Heyes/Rickman/Tzavara
(2001) analyze such a model in the presence of Legal Cost Insurance and en-
dogenous ex ante care levels, and it would be valuable to see how the current
results carry over to that setting.
This would also allow for an analysis of how TPC contracts might aﬀect
the plaintiﬀ’s credibility constraint, as analyzed by Nalebuff (1987). One
might also ask how a TPC contract aﬀects the dynamics of settlement negoti-
ations in a model such as Spier (1994) to examine the inﬂuence of contingent
fee contracts on the amount and timing of settlement.24 It may also be fruit-
ful to model the impact of TPC contracts on the incentives of attorneys that
represent the parties.
24Rickman (1999) presents a dynamic model of pre-trial bargaining with contingent
fees.
22The introduction of risk-aversion on the side of the plaintiﬀ would alter some
of our quantitative results, but the the current paper highlights how their
strategic eﬀect makes TPC contracts attractive even for risk-neutral cus-
tomers. Insurance institutions do not only serve to solve problems of risk-
allocation, but may also serve strategic goals, such as improving one’s posi-
tion in settlement negotiations, whether illiquid or otherwise.25
4 Conclusions
A number of institutional developments have taken place in recent times,
concerning the way in which lawyers and courts can be paid in legal services
markets across Europe. Although these developments are taking place with
some speed, we have noted a general tendency for them to combine some
form of result-contingent payment with insurance against cost. This third
party element appears necessary to provide protection against the extra cost
risk imposed by British cost rules.
We have modeled, for the ﬁrst time, a particular class of such arrangements:
the TPC contracts emerging in Germany; noting that these are also at-
tracting interest elsewhere in Europe. Two eﬀects of these contracts are
highlighted by the model:
• First, their ability to add credibility to an otherwise weak (or low value)
case, such that it becomes proﬁtable for a plaintiﬀ to threaten trial;
• Second, again by shielding the plaintiﬀ against cost, their ability to
increase (gross) settlements in the event of a negotiated settlement of
the case;
Our model allows to derive the parameter constellations under which the
litigants will settle their case as well as those parameter settings under which
the case proceeds to trial. These predictions could be tested in a laboratory
experiment.
To the extent that these eﬀects both occur in a model with risk neutral par-
ties, they can be thought of as “strategic” eﬀects. In principle, the strategic
eﬀect may be so strong that the mere threat of entering into such a contract
can force settlement (at improved terms) in cases that would otherwise be
dropped. Since, in this case, the TPC contract only serves as a credible
25See Kirstein (2000).
23threat and is not actually made, this would beneﬁt the plaintiﬀ, but not the
third parties. One research question raised by our model is to what extent
insurers restrict pre-contract negotiations between plaintiﬀ and defendant
(i.e., generate our Game 2 rather than Game 3).
Clearly, the ways in which result-contingent payment may be combined with
British cost rules and (perhaps necessarily) Legal Costs Insurance has con-
siderable potential for further economic analysis. What is more, there is
evidence that such changes can have implications for other institutional ele-
ments of legal systems. In the case of the UK, Stanbury (2001) describes
how insurers are beginning to monitor and challenge the bases on which costs
are assessed, while Peysner (2001) notes that the British rule may itself be
called into question if such mechanisms as those we have analyzed cannot
be made to work. With some European countries seeking to reduce public
expenditures on legal aid, and place more reliance on private insurance alter-
natives, the insights that economic analysis can generate are likely to inform
an increasingly important policy debate.
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